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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the Third District Court err in ordering a new sale of
the SAIC Barn free and clear of all liens, interests, and
encumbrances?
Standard of Review:

The standard of review is clearly

stated in the unambiguous language of Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).

That rule provides:

"Findings of fact, whether

based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous . . . ."

(Emphasis added.)

The

decision of In re Infant Anonymous cited by Appellant does not
govern this appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314:
Unless the court orders otherwise, the liquidator
has the following powers and responsibilities:
. . . .

(9) He may acquire, hypothecate, encumber, lease,
improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of or
deal with any property of the insurer at its market
value or upon fair and reasonable terms and conditions,
except that no transaction involving property with a
market value exceeding $25,000 may be concluded without
the express permission of the court.

(23) He may exercise all the powers conferred upon
receivers by the laws of this state which are not
inconsistent with this chapter.
1

2.
and (b):

Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (1)(a)
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall
be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or
citations by page number to relevant portions of
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. . . .
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum
in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. . . .
STATEMENT OF CASE

Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC") was placed into
liquidation in March of 1992 by order of the Third District Court
(the "Third District Court").

The Utah Insurance Commissioner

was appointed at that time as the statutory liquidator of SAIC
(the "Liquidator").

As part of the Liquidator's statutory duties

and responsibilities, the Liquidator is authorized to "exercise
all the powers conferred upon receivers by the laws of this
state" under the supervision of the Third District Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (23).
One of the Liquidator's responsibilities is to liquidate
SAIC's assets.

The Utah Insurance Code requires the Liquidator

to obtain the Third District Court's approval for the sale of
assets with a market value exceeding $25,000.

Utah Code Ann. §

31A-27-314 (9). One of those assets is the former headquarters

2

building of SAIC (a converted dairy barn) commonly known as the
"SAIC Barn".
In February of 1994, Appellant Golfland Entertainment
Centers, Inc. ("Golfland") submitted an oral offer for the
purchase of the SAIC Barn, which oral offer extended to the
purchase of two adjacent properties, a water park and a storage
shed, which were under the jurisdiction of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Bankruptcy
Court").

The three properties were being sold together, and the

sellers required simultaneous closing of all three properties.
The Third District Court entered an order of February 24, 1994
(the "1994 Order"), approving Golfland's purchase of the SAIC
Barn, but subject to the terms and conditions submitted to the
Third District Court.

The Bankruptcy Court initially approved

Golfland's purchase of the water park and the storage shed on
February 23, 1994. However, the Bankruptcy Court later rescinded
its approval of the sale of the water park, and eventually
approved a sale of the water park to another buyer.
The agreement for the purchase of the SAIC Barn required the
closing on all three properties to occur by April 8, 1994.
However, because the Bankruptcy Court had rescinded its approval
of the sale of the water park and because other conditions
precedent for the sale to be consummated were not satisfied, the
closing did not occur by that deadline.

3

Thereafter, the Liquidator received an offer from Provo City
to purchase the SAIC Barn.

The Liquidator then filed his "Motion

for Supplemental Order Approving Sale of Southern American
Insurance Company Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens,
Interests and Encumbrances" (the "Liquidator's Motion") on August
12, 1994, seeking either the Third District Court's authorization
to sell the SAIC Barn to Provo City, or alternatively, requesting
the Third District Court to set the terms of any sale of the SAIC
Barn to Golfland if the Third District Court determined that the
Liquidator was still obligated to sell to Golfland.

Golfland

objected and filed several memoranda with attached documentation
in support of its objection.

Golfland requested oral argument

but did not request an evidentiary hearing in its memoranda.
After oral argument on April 17, 1995, the Third District
Court ruled that the Liquidator was not required to sell the SAIC
Barn to Golfland, nor did it approve the Liquidator's request to
sell the SAIC Barn to Provo City.

Instead, the Third District

Court exercised its discretion as the supervising Court for the
SAIC liquidation by ordering the Liquidator to sell the SAIC Barn
at a new auction to the highest bidder free and clear of all
liens, interests, and encumbrances, with Golfland being allowed
to participate in the new auction.

The Third District Court's

order reflecting its ruling was entered on July 11, 1995 (the
"1995 Order").

Golfland has appealed the 1995 Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
4

Golfland7s Offer to Purchase the SAIC Barn.
1.

Golfland was the high bidder at a February 22, 1994

oral auction for the purchase of the SAIC Barn, the Seven Peaks
Water Park (the "Water Park") owned by BCD Corporation (which was
in bankruptcy), and an adjacent storage shed facility owned by
CDX Corporation (also in bankruptcy) (the "Storage Shed").
1855.

(All references to the Record are cited as "R.

R.

").

Golfland submitted a single combined bid for the three properties
of $2,610,000, allocated as follows:

$2,200,000 for the Water

Park, $360,000 for the SAIC Barn, and $50,000 for the CDX Storage
Shed.

R. 1989.
2.

Golfland's oral offer to purchase the SAIC Barn and the

other two properties adopted the terms of a previous offer
submitted by B&B Properties Company, L.C. ("B&B"),1 except that
Golfland waived all of the conditions to closing contained in the

*In the fall of 1993, the Liquidator received and accepted,
subject to the Third District Court's approval and to higher and
better offers, an offer (the "B & B Offer") from B & B to
purchase the SAIC Barn for $200,000 in conjunction with the sale
of the Water Park and Storage Shed. The sale of the Water Park
and Storage Shed were subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy
Court. The terms of the B & B Offer were contained in the "Offer
to Purchase and Sale and Purchase Agreement and Closing
Instructions Relating Thereto", the "Extension and Amendment of
Offer", the "Acceptance of Offer as Modified and Counteroffer",
and the "Acceptance of Counteroffer and Counter-Counteroffer".
(R. 1249-1271.) The Liquidator subsequently received several
higher and better offers for the Water Park, the SAIC Barn, and
the CDX Storage Shed, and an oral auction of the three properties
was conducted on February 22, 1994. R. 1854.
5

B & B Offer other than title insurance, and Golfland also agreed
to "close" in two weeks from the date of the auction.
3.

R. 1794.

Golfland's offer adopted the provisions of the B&B

Offer, which reflected that the SAIC Barn had to be sold in
conjunction with the sale of the Water Park and the CDX Storage
Shed.

R. 1254, 1267, 1794.
4.

The B&B offer adopted by Golfland further stated that

the deadline for closing the sale of the SAIC Barn was April 8,
1994, and outlined the following course of action if the sale of
the SAIC Barn failed to close by that deadline:
[P]rovided further that unless the Closing shall occur
on or before one hundred and twenty (120) days after
the later of the dates appearing next to the signatures
of Seller and Buyer on this Agreement, the Title
Company Account shall terminate without further acts of
the parties hereto, and in such event the Title Company
shall, except as otherwise expressly provided in
Paragraph 10 hereof, return all documents and funds
deposited pursuant hereto to the parties depositing the
same and neither party shall have any further liability
to the other hereunder, except as otherwise expressly
provided in said Paragraph 10 hereof.
R. 1264-1265.
5.

Following the February 22, 1994 auction, the Third

District Court entered its "Order Approving Sale of Property of
the Liquidation Estate Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and
Encumbrances" on February 24, 1994 (the "1994 Order").

R. 1539-

1542.
6.

A hearing was held before the Bankruptcy Court on

February 23, 1994, seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of the sale

6

of the Water Park and the Storage Shed to Golfland, consistent
with the requirement in the Golfland offer that these two
properties be sold simultaneously with the SAIC Barn.
1797.

R. 1796-

The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the Water Park

and the Storage Shed to Golfland at that hearing, and written
orders approving the sale were entered by the Bankruptcy Court on
March 31, 1994.

R. 1796-1797.

A second bidder at the February

22, 1994 auction, Peak Investments Incorporated ("Peak") was
approved by the Bankruptcy Court as a back-up purchaser of the
Water Park and the Storage Shed.

R. 1796-1797.

The Failed Sale of the SAIC Barn.
7.

Following the entry of the 1994 Order, disputes arose

between the Liquidator and Golfland concerning their respective
obligations to each other with respect to the sale of the SAIC
Barn.

R. 1797, 1942.
8.

In particular, questions arose as to whether an

underground storage tank still existed on the SAIC Barn property,
and whether there had been petroleum contamination from that
underground storage tank.

R. 2064.

Golfland asserted that even

though it had waived the conditions to closing contained in the
B & B offer it adopted, including the right to receive and
approve an environmental assessment report of the SAIC Barn, it
had not waived its right to insist that the Liquidator give to
Golfland at closing the environmental warranties originally
required by B & B in its offer.

R. 2063, 2640.
7

9.

The Liquidator asserted that the waiver of the

condition of closing relating to the environmental issues also
constituted a waiver of the environmental warranty and that the
risk of any environmental problems had been assumed by Golfland.
R. 2063, 2640.

Golfland demanded that the Liquidator provide the

environmental warranty and insisted that it had not waived this
requirement at the auction.
10.

R. 2063, 2640.

As a result of Golfland's demand, the parties

eventually agreed to cap any potential liability of the SAIC
estate associated with any environmental warranty for the SAIC
Barn at $200,000.
11.

R. 2605, 1795.

On March 8, 1994, Golfland deposited the sum of

$360,000 (along with other funds for the purchase of the Water
Park and the CDX Storage Shed, totalling $2,610,000) with
Security Title and Abstract Company (the "Title Company") for the
purchase of the SAIC Barn, subject to Golfland/s sole discretion
as to the disposition of the funds.
12.

R. 1934.

On April 7, 1994, Peak filed with the Bankruptcy Court

a "Motion to Enforce Sale to Alternative Bidder and
Motion for Stay" (the "Peak Motion for Stay"), seeking a stay of
the Bankruptcy Court's Order authorizing the sale of the Water
Park to Golfland.
13.

R. 1800.

Peak contended that Golfland had failed to meet the

requirements set forth in the Bankruptcy Court's Order
authorizing the sale of the Water Park, and that the terms and
8

conditions of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland were a major
modification from those authorized by the Bankruptcy Court.
R. 2070.
14.

Because of the filing of Peak's Motion for Stay, the

Title Company declined to issue to Golfland a title insurance
policy on the Water Park, which was a condition precedent to
closing the sale of the Water Park which only Golfland could
waive.

R. 2071, 1801.

Golfland declined to waive that condition

precedent for its protection; accordingly, the sale of the SAIC
Barn to Golfland did not close by April 8, 1994, R. 1801, as
required by the B&B offer adopted by Golfland.

R. 1264-1265.

Peak's Motion to Stay is Granted.
15.

During the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, John Kenney,

Golfland's representative at the auction, testified that he
understood that the effect of waiving the conditions to closing,
including the environmental report, was to subject Golfland to
paying the costs associated with environmental problems.
1953.

R.

This statement was contrary to Golfland's post-auction

assertions to the Liquidator when negotiating concessions
concerning potential environmental problems.
16.

R. 2063.

On June 6, 1994, following a four day evidentiary

hearing, and after weighing the testimony, the Bankruptcy Court
found that all bidders at the February 22, 1994 auction "believed
that the risk of environmental problems on the property being
purchased was thereby shifted to the buyer," and that the final
9

terms of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland were not the sale
terms approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

R. 2605-2606.

The

Bankruptcy Court found that this agreement was a major change in
the terms of the sale.
that

R. 2607.

The Bankruptcy Court also found

fl

[t]he terms that the parties thought they were bargaining

on and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the sale which
is ultimately proposed to the court."

R. 2606.

The Bankruptcy

Court held that the sale to Golfland was not authorized.
2608.

R.

The Bankruptcy Court ordered the owner of the Water Park

not to proceed with a final sale of the Water Park without
further order of the Bankruptcy Court.

R. 2608.

A copy of the

Bankruptcy Court ruling is attached hereto in the Addendum at
Exhibit "C."
17.

On July 6, 1994, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order

(the "1994 Bankruptcy Order") formally setting aside its March
31, 1994 Order authorizing the sale of the Water Park to
Golfland.

R. 1957-1959.

A copy of the 1994 Bankruptcy Order is

attached hereto in the Addendum at Exhibit "C."
18.

The Liquidator subsequently received an offer from

Provo City to purchase the SAIC Barn for $395,000.
19.

R. 1863-1865.

On August 11, 1994, Golfland filed a Motion for Leave

to File Complaint Against Liquidation Estate (the "Golfland
Motion") and a supporting memorandum with the Third District
Court.

R. 1779-1814.
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20.

On August 12, 1994, the Liquidator filed "Liquidator's

Motion for Supplemental Order Approving Sale of Southern American
Insurance Company Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens,
Interests and Encumbrances11 (the "Liquidator's Motion") . R.
1815-1818.

The Liquidator's Motion requested that the Third

District Court authorize the sale of the SAIC Barn to Provo City
because the conditions precedent relating to the sale of the SAIC
Barn to Golfland had failed, or alternatively, that the Third
District Court set the terms of the sale of the SAIC Barn to
Golfland if the Third District Court determined that the
Liquidator was still obligated to Golfland.
21.

R. 1815-1818.

The Liquidator and Golfland argued their respective

motions before the Third District Court on April 17, 1995.
R. 3131. After consideration of the parties' extensive briefs,
the documentary evidence submitted by both parties, and the oral
arguments of counsel, the Third District Court ordered the
Liquidator not to sell to either Provo City or Golfland, but
rather, to sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction to the highest
bidder.

R. 3133.

Golfland Motion.2

The Third District Court also granted the
R. 2977.

2

0n June 22, 1995, Golfland filed a complaint against the
Liquidator in the Third District Court (the "Golfland
Complaint"). The Liquidator has filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Golfland Complaint, which remains pending before the Third
District Court.
11

22.

The Liquidator subsequently prepared his proposed Order

Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and
Encumbrances (the "Proposed Order").

R. 2938-2944.

On May 5,

1995, Golfland filed an objection to the Proposed Order,
including an argument that evidence was taken at the hearing.
R. 2933-2937.

Documentary evidence was submitted by both

Golfland and the Liquidator with the pleadings.

R. 1835-1862;

1922-1956; 2055-2075; 2600-2644.
23.

On July 7, 1995, the Third District Court entered its

Order Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and
Encumbrances (the "1995 Order"), R. 3131-3136, finding that:
a.

The sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland was
contingent upon conditions which never occurred.
R. 3132, 5 2.

b.

Golfland7s alleged tender of the purchase funds
did not amount to a proper tender with respect to
the closing. R. 3132, 5 3.

c.

The closing of the sale of the SAIC Barn did not
occur in a timely fashion. R. 3132, 5 4.

d.

The condition precedent that the SAIC Barn
simultaneously close with the sale of the Water
Park was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court's July
6, 1994 order; thus there was no binding agreement
between the Liquidator and Golfland for the sale
of the SAIC Barn. R. 3132, 5 5.

e.

Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 order authorizing
the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland was
"ineffective" because the terms of the Original
Barn Sale Order were different than the terms of

12

the Golfland offer that was frustrated by the
Bankruptcy Court. R. 3133, f 6.
f•

24.

Specific performance was not an available remedy
because the SAIC Barn was not "unique." R. 3133,
1 7.

On July 28, 1995, Golfland filed a Notice of Appeal of

the 1995 Order.

R. 3263-3271.

Golfland's initial appeal was

assigned to this Court under Court of Appeals No. 960419.

On

December 27, 1996, this Court dismissed Golfland's original
appeal for lack of finality.

R. 5157-5162.

On July 22, 1997,

the Third District Court certified the 1995 Order as a final
order.

R. 6316-6319.

on August 20, 1997.

Golfland filed its second Notice of Appeal

R. 6307-6309.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Third District Court correctly ordered the Liquidator to
sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction.

The Third District Court

properly ruled that the terms for the sale of the SAIC Barn to
Golfland under the 1994 Order had not been met because the
contingencies for the sale never occurred.

It is beyond dispute

that the Bankruptcy Court withdrew approval for the sale of the
Water Park, which was a condition precedent for the simultaneous
sale of the SAIC Barn.

The Bankruptcy Court's order has been

affirmed by the Federal District Court (twice) and by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Golfland cannot change history.

Moreover, Golfland is collaterally estopped from relitigating in
the Third District Court the dispute over whether or not the

13

Bankruptcy Court should have ordered the sale of the Water Park
to Golfland.

The Third District Court properly ordered the

Liquidator to hold a new auction for the SAIC Barn.
The Third District Court did not commit any procedural
errors and did not deprive Golfland of any procedural rights.
The Third District Court did not err in finding that documentary
evidence was submitted to it in accordance with the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

The Third District Court also did not

err by not holding an evidentiary hearing after Golfland failed
to timely request such a hearing.

Moreover, the Third District

Court provided a forum for Golfland's grievances by granting
leave for Golfland to file a complaint against the Liquidator .if
Golfland could prove any damages against the Liquidator.
Golfland cannot litigate in this appeal issues which are still
pending before the Third District Court in that lawsuit.
Golfland also waived any alleged procedural errors.
Golfland acquiesced in the submission of documentary evidence and
itself submitted documentary evidence to the Third District
Court.

Golfland also did not object to any of the documentary

evidence offered by both the Liquidator and Golfland.

Finally,

the 1995 Order is not internally inconsistent or otherwise
defective, and is fully supported by the record.
should affirm the 1995 Order.
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This Court

ARGUMENT
I.

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE TERMS OP
THE ORIGINAL SALES AGREEMENT WERE NOT MET BECAUSE THE
CONTINGENCIES FOR THE SALE NEVER OCCURRED.
The Third District Court found that the sale of the SAIC

Barn to Golfland was contingent upon conditions which never
occurred, including the sale of the SAIC Barn in a timely
fashion, and that the condition precedent that the SAIC Barn
simultaneously close with the sale of the Water Park was
frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court's order withdrawing approval
of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland, thus resulting in no
binding agreement between the Liquidator and Golfland for the
sale of the SAIC Barn.

These findings of fact are fully

supported by the evidence before the Third District Court, and
they are not clearly erroneous.3

Furthermore, these findings

alone are sufficient to affirm the Third District Court's ruling.
A.

The Evidence Before the Third District Court Supported
Its Finding That the Bankruptcy Court Withdrew Approval
for the Sale of the Water Park, Thereby Frustrating the
Sale of the SAIC Barn.

The Third District Court ordered a new auction of the SAIC
Barn because the contingencies for the sale of the SAIC Barn to
Golfland did not occur.

Although Golfland now belatedly regrets

3

Instead of attacking these findings as clearly erroneous,
Golfland instead argues that these findings are mere "dicta" and
should be ignored. Brief of Appellant ("Golfland Brief") at p.
21. It is clear that these findings are not dicta but are the
central focus of the 1995 Order. Golfland obviously hopes to
downplay these findings because they are so damaging to Golfland.
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that it agreed to these two contingencies, Golfland concedes, as
it must do, that these contingencies existed and that they did
not occur.

Golfland Brief at p. 35. Moreover, Golfland must

concede that these two contingencies will never occur, no matter
how many evidentiary hearings Golfland is given on these issues.
Although Golfland has argued that the Third District Court's
failure to give it an evidentiary hearing, such an evidentiary
would have been futile, because an evidentiary hearing cannot
change historical events (evidenced by documentary evidence
submitted to the Third District Court) which cannot be reversed
or changed.
The Third District Court was apprised by both Golfland and
the Liquidator through documentary evidence that the
contingencies of Bankruptcy Court approval and a simultaneous
sale had failed.

Notwithstanding Golfland's complaints about

"procedural irregularities," Golfland admits that Bankruptcy
Court approval was withdrawn and that the Third District Court
was advised of that undisputed fact.

The Bankruptcy Court's

ruling was presented to the Third District Court, which properly
took judicial notice of that ruling as a basis for its own ruling
that the sale of the SAIC Barn was "contingent upon conditions
which never occurred."

R. 3132. Golfland grudgingly concedes

that "on its face, the language of this factual finding is not
erroneous."

Golfland Brief at p. 35.
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B.

The Bankruptcy Court's Order Rescinding Approval of the
Sale of the Water Park to Golfland Has Been Affirmed By
the Federal District Court and the Tenth Circuit,

Golfland's plea for an evidentiary hearing is futile.

The

Bankruptcy Court's ruling withdrawing approval of the sale of the
Water Park to Golfland has now been affirmed twice by the United
States District Court for the District of Utah (the "Federal
District Court") and once by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Golfland's attempt to reinstate the Bankruptcy Court's approval
through its federal appeals has failed.
Golfland's first appeal in the federal system was assigned
to Chief Judge David Sam of the Federal District Court.

On

September 19, 1995, Judge Sam affirmed the 1994 Bankruptcy Court
Order as follows:
The court finds that the bankruptcy court's ruling
that the sale should be set aside is not an abuse of
discretion. The bankruptcy court found that there was
a mistake in the sale sufficient to justify setting
aside the sale because "[e]veryone at the auction
believed that the risk of environmental problems on the
property being purchased was shifted to the buyer."
This factual finding is supported by sufficient
evidence in the record, and the court's finding that
this misunderstanding is a mistake as to a material
term of the sale appears correct. Such a mistake would
indicate that the bidders did not have a fair
opportunity to bid at the sale, and mistakes which
affect the fairness of the bidding process are the type
which would ordinarily be seen as sufficient to justify
setting aside a confirmed sale.
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In re BCD Corp, (Golfland Entertainment Centers. Inc, v. Peak
Investment. I n c . and BCD Corp,), No. 94-C-0329-S (DU, September
19, 1995). 4
Golfland next appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

On July 21,

1997, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and the
Federal District Court.

In re BCD Corporation (Golfland

Entertainment Centers. Inc. v. Peak Investment. Inc.). 119 F.3d
852 (10th Cir. 1997).

The Tenth Circuit ruled as follows:

Under this standard we are convinced that the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
setting aside the original sale when it concluded that
the confirmation had been granted through a mistake as
to the terms of the sale. The bankruptcy court found
that initially everyone present at the bidding
"believed that the risk of environmental problems on
the property being purchased was thereby shifted to the
buyer." However, the sellers and Golfland disagreed as
to the terms of the sale, in particular whether
Golfland had assumed the risk of environmental
remediation. The parties then agreed that the sellers
would assume the risk of the first $200,000 in
environmental liability and half of a $33,000 bond that
had been filed to meet municipal requirements. As a
result, the bankruptcy court found that "[t]he terms
that the parties thought they were bargaining and
bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the sale
which is ultimately proposed to the court."
Id. at 860-61 (record citations omitted).
Although the court's findings could have been stated
more clearly, we read the court as having found that

4

A copy of Judge Sam's 9/19/95 Order is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A." The Liquidator has cited and attached copies of
Chief Judge Sam's unpublished decision and the unpublished
decision of Judge Kimball attached hereto as Exhibit "B" in
accordance with the Federal District Court's Local Rule DUCiv R
7-2(a).
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Golfland and BCD as the seller had never actually
agreed upon the terms of the sale, specifically with
regard to the environmental warranty provisions.
Id. at 861.
We are convinced, based on all the evidence, that
the bankruptcy court's factual finding that there never
were agreed-upon terms for the sale of the water park
was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the bankruptcy
court's decision to set aside the confirmed sale on the
ground that it had been entered under a mistake as to
the terms of the agreement was not an abuse of
discretion. . . .
Golfland's other challenges to the decisions of
the bankruptcy court and the district court are that
the factual finding that Golfland waived the
environmental warranties was clearly erroneous and
that, even assuming that Golfland had changed the terms
of the sale, the proper remedy would have been to allow
the sale to go forward under the original terms
presented to the bankruptcy court.
We have considered these arguments and are not
persuaded that it was error or an abuse of discretion
to set aside the sale. The argument regarding whether
Golfland had waived the environmental warranties is
irrelevant, given the finding, which we uphold, that
there had not been an agreement as to the terms of the
sale. Similarly the bankruptcy court could not enforce
the original terms of the sale because there had been
no agreement as to the original terms . . . .
Id. at 861-62.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's ruling, Golfland had filed a
Proof of Claim in the BCD bankruptcy case for its alleged damages
arising from BCD's failure to sell the Water Park to Golfland.
After the Tenth Circuit ruled, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed
Golfland's Proof of Claim.

Golfland again appealed to the

Federal District Court, and its second appeal was assigned to
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Federal District Judge Dale Kimball.

On June 4, 1998, Judge

Kimball affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, ruling as follows:
In BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment. Inc., 119
F.3d 852 (1997) the Tenth Circuit held that it was not
error or an abuse of discretion on the part of the
Bankruptcy Court to set aside the sale of the water
park to Golfland. The Tenth Circuit further held that
there had not been an agreement as to the terms of the
sale and "the bankruptcy court could not enforce the
original terms of the sale because there had been no
agreement as to the original terms. . . . "
Id. at 862.
In other words, the Tenth Circuit's ruling makes it
clear that no contract existed between Golfland and BCD
Corporation. Even though Golfland's Proof of Claim was
not brought in the identical case that was appealed to
the Tenth Circuit, it is clear to this court that all
claims brought in the Proof of Claim are untenable
based upon the umbrella of the Tenth Circuit's ruling
and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the final sale
for $3,600,000.00 to a third party. All of Golfland's
claims against BCD flow from the failure to perform
under the February Contract. The Tenth Circuit has
ruled that there was no meeting of the minds as to the
February Contract and therefore no contract existed.
If there was no contract, Golfland does not have a
remedy at law. Although this may not be exactly the
kind of case that the "law of the case" doctrine
typically applies to, this court cannot reverse the
Tenth Circuit's ruling that there was no contract
between the parties which is what would have to be done
in order for the appellant to have a cause of action.
In re BCD Corporation (Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v.
BCD Corporation and Southern American Insurance Company), No.
2:97 CV 953K (DU, June 4, 1998).5
The evidentiary hearing demanded by Golfland could never
change the fact that there was no Bankruptcy Court approval and

5

A copy of Judge Kimball's 6/4/98 Order is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B" in accordance with the Federal District Court's
Local Rule DUCiv R 7-2(a).
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no simultaneous sale, and no possibility of reinstating either of
those contingencies.

The undisputed facts that the Bankruptcy

Court withdrew its approval of the sale of the Water Park and
that the sale of the SAIC Barn did not occur simultaneously with
the sale of the Water Park and the Storage Shed, coupled with the
federal system/s final affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court's
actions, obviate the need for any further litigation or evidence
on these historical facts.
C.

Collateral Estoppel Bars Golfland From Relitigatincr
Issues In a Jury Trial Before the Third District Court
That Have Been Conclusively Decided by the Bankruptcy
Court and Affirmed by the Federal District Court and
the Tenth Circuit.

Recognizing that it cannot change history, or change the
rulings of three federal courts, Golfland now relies upon two
arguments for asserting that Golfland is entitled to a jury trial
to prove that the Liquidator is still contractually obligated to
sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland.

Golfland argues: (1) "a party

who is responsible for the failure of a condition [precedent] may
not escape liability based upon such failure," and (2) "where a
party waives a condition, the contract may be enforced despite
the failure of such condition."

Golfland Brief at p. 35.

Both of these arguments are flawed.

Golfland complains that

it did not have its fair day in court on these two arguments.
The reality is that Golfland has had two fair hearings on its
claim that the Liquidator was responsible for the failed sale, a
four day evidentiary hearing before the Bankruptcy Court and oral
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argument based upon documentary evidence before the Third
District Court.

In rendering its decision, the Third District

Court correctly applied collateral estoppel principles by finding
that the contingencies to the sale were not met and the sale
terms were not the same, and ordering a new auction for the SAIC
Barn.

The Third District Court did not usurp the role of the

jury as alleged by Golfland, but had before it all of the
necessary evidence to make these findings and to apply collateral
estoppel against Golfland.

Furthermore, Golfland's argument that

the Liquidator allegedly waived the contingencies to the sale
ignores the Third District Court's approval role in the process
of concluding any sale of the SAIC Barn.
1.

The Third District Court Correctly Applied
Collateral Estoppel Against Golfland.

The case of Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch,
Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 769
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988), is remarkably similar to this case.

In an

earlier action, Trimble unsuccessfully sued the buyer in a real
estate transaction for a real estate commission.
and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.

Trimble lost,
Trimble then sued

the seller, Monte Vista, for his real estate commission.

"Monte

Vista moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds,
including res judicata and collateral estoppel, and attached to
its supporting memorandum a copy of the Utah Supreme Court
opinion affirming the judgment in the prior trial.
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Id. at 452.

Trimble attempted to controvert the Utah Supreme Court opinion by
"a single paragraph disputing, in conclusory terms, Monte Vista's
argument that the question of whether any commission was owed to
Trimble had been litigated in the first action and decided
adversely to Trimble."

Id.

"Additional memoranda were submitted

and the motion orally argued, but Trimble offered no other
information relative to the res judicata issue."

Id. at 453.

The trial court in the second action ruled against Trimble, and
"relied, as had the parties, exclusively on the Supreme Court's
reported decision in the earlier case."

Id.

On appeal, Trimble argued that the trial court improperly
determined that collateral estoppel applied by relying solely
upon the Utah Supreme Court opinion.

This Court first reviewed

the four elements of the test to determine whether collateral
estoppel applies, namely:
1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?
2)

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?
4) Was the issue in the first case competently, fully,
and fairly litigated?
Id. at 454, citing. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691
(Utah 1978).

This Court found that all four elements for

applying collateral estoppel had been met.
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Trimble claimed that the trial court was required to take
judicial notice of the entire trial court record and determine
for itself if it was consistent with the Utah Supreme Court
opinion.

This Court rejected Trimble's argument, concluding that

Trimble acquiesced in the trial court's ruling based only on the
published opinion:
As we see it, once Monte Vista submitted to the
district court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion,
which on its face showed that the key issue had been
litigated and decided, the burden shifted to Trimble,
if it believed more than the opinion was needed to make
a fully informed decision, to produce the record of the
prior proceeding, urge the court to take judicial
notice of it, or otherwise show that the opinion should
not be taken at face value. Instead, Trimble limited
its resistance to arguing how the Supreme Court opinion
should actually be construed and to the doctrinal
requirements of collateral estoppel. . . . The trial
court in this case was likewise led to believe that the
opinion was all that it needed to decide the collateral
estoppel aspect of the motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 455.
The four elements for the application of collateral estoppel
likewise were satisfied before the Third District Court.6

First,

the two issues before the Bankruptcy Court (i.e., whether or not
the Bankruptcy Court would approve the sale of the Water Park to

6

Under the Mel Trimble analysis, the Third District Court
was not required to take judicial notice of the entire Bankruptcy
Court record in order to rule on collateral estoppel grounds.
Id. at 455-456. The Third District Court ruled on the basis of
those portions of the Bankruptcy Court record and other
documentary evidence submitted to it by the parties. However,
the Mel Trimble case makes its clear that the Third District
Court's judicial notice of the 1994 Bankruptcy Order by itself
would be a sufficient basis to uphold the 1995 Order.
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Golfland, and whether or not there a binding agreement on the
terms of the sale of the combined properties that would give
Golfland a vested right to the properties) were also at issue
before the Third District Court.

Second, it is beyond dispute

that the Bankruptcy Court's decision, as affirmed by the Federal
District Court and the Tenth Circuit, is a final decision on the
merits.

Third, Golfland was a party to both actions.

Fourth,

the issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated7 in a four
day evidentiary hearing before the Bankruptcy Court in which
Golfland fully participated.
Golfland will undoubtedly argue, as it has argued before in
its federal court appeals, that collateral estoppel does not
apply because Golfland and the sellers of the combined properties
were allegedly not adversaries at the Bankruptcy Court hearing.
However, that argument does not make any sense with respect to
the undisputed fact that Bankruptcy Court approval of the sale of
the Water Park to Golfland was withdrawn.

7

That argument, if

Golfland will undoubtedly argue, as it repeatedly did in
its federal appeals, that it was "ambushed" before the Bankruptcy
Court and was therefore prejudiced and did not get a fair
hearing. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument. "[T]here was
no lack of vigorous action by Golfland in building the record to
uphold the first sale to Golfland. Nor has Golfland suggested or
shown that BCD somehow obstructed or prevented it from developing
any aspect of the record that would have a material impact on
this appeal. Considering the lack of such a showing, and the
extensive record [from the four day evidentiary hearing] — much
of which consisted of Mr. Shields' [Golfland's attorney]
questioning — we are at a loss to understand how Golfland has
been prejudiced." In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 858-59.
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applicable, could apply only to the Bankruptcy Court's finding
that there was no enforceable contract.
The Utah courts do not adhere to the requirement of strict
"adverseness" to apply collateral estoppel.

Indeed, this Court

in the Mel Trimble case stated that collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, could be applied "even if only 'the party against
whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication.,M

Id. at 453, quoting. Copper

State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

Accord, Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 278 (8th Cir.

1979) (requirement of strict "adversity" to apply collateral
estoppel relaxed; "[i]f a stranger to the prior litigation may
invoke estoppel as a defense, then a fortiori a co-party in the
prior action ought to be able to preclude a former co-party from
relitigating issues finally adjudicated in the prior lawsuit").
Even if adversary status is required, the Tenth Circuit
has recognized that even co-parties who technically are on the
same side of a controversy on the pleadings, but who are in fact
adversarial to each other as to an issue, can be bound by the
adjudication of that issue in the prior controversy:
But the formal arrangement of the parties on the
record is not important, and if coparties on the record
were in fact adversaries as to an issue, and such issue
was in fact litigated and they had full opportunity to
contest it with each other, either upon the pleadings
between themselves and the plaintiff or upon crosspleadings between themselves, they are concluded by the
adjudication of such issue in a subseguent controversy
between each other.
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Ohio Casualty Ins, Co, v. Gordon. 95 F.2d 605, 609 (10th Cir.
1938) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Comment (a) to Section 38 of the Restatement Second of
Judgments provides further support for why parties who are
technically not adversaries under the pleadings can still be
bound by collateral estoppel:
[P]arties aligned on the same side in the pleadings may
be drawn into controversy between themselves on an
issue that is at the same time material to their rights
or obligations regarding their common adversary and to
rights and obligations subsisting between them. Thus,
defendants sued by a plaintiff who has stated a claim
against them in the alternative may defend not only by
disputing the plaintiff's case but by adducing proof
and argument against each other. . . . In such
circumstances, the co-parties may have an opportunity
and incentive to litigate the issues arising between
them that is equivalent to that between parties whose
opposition is defined through pleadings. . . . Where
those criteria are satisfied, the determination of the
issues has equivalent effect as if they were pleaded.
Restatement Second of Judgments, Section 38, Comment (a) (1982).
In this case, SAIC and Golfland were "drawn into controversy
between themselves" during the 1994 hearing before the Bankruptcy
Court because of the differing proof supplied by witnesses for
SAIC and Golfland as to whether or not there had been agreement
on the original terms for the sale of the combined properties.
The attorney for the Liquidator testified that there was
confusion about the sale terms.
at 861-62.

In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d

"[T]he bankruptcy court could not enforce the

original terms of the sale because there had been no agreement as
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to the original terms, as demonstrated by the testimony of Mr.
Monson."

Id. at 862.

Golfland's attorney called various witnesses in an attempt
to show that Golfland had not altered the sale terms, id. at 859
n.6, but even Golfland's main witness, Mr. Kenney, was forced to
concede that there was confusion as to the sale terms.
861.

Id. at

SAIC and Golfland had the opportunity and the incentive to

litigate whether the parties had agreed upon sale terms for the
combined properties, and the Bankruptcy Court's finding that "the
parties could not agree on the terms of the sale," id. at 861
n.7r was essential to "the bankruptcy court's decision to set
aside the confirmed sale on the ground that it had been entered
under a mistake as to the terms of the agreement [which the Tenth
Circuit ruled] was not an abuse of discretion."

Id. at 861-62.

Even if this Court were to conclude that SAIC and Golfland
were not adverse to each other in presenting proof to the
Bankruptcy Court on whether there was a meeting of the minds on
the sale terms for the combined properties, formal "adversity" is
not required if the finding made in the first suit is an
essential element in the subsequent action:
Co-parties who are not adversaries, may be bound by a
judgment in a subsequent controversy between each other
where they, in fact, occupied, in the prior trial, the
attitude of adversaries, or where some finding of fact
is made in the first suit which is an essential element
in the subsequent claim or action. On the questions
whether parties are bound by a judgment, the formal
arrangement of parties on the record is unimportant, so
that if co-parties on the record were, in fact,
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adversaries on an issue, and the issue was actually
litigated, and they had full opportunity to contest it
with each other, either on pleadings between themselves
and the plaintiff, or on cross-pleadings between
themselves, co-parties are concluded by adjudication of
that issue in a subsequent controversy between each
other.
Fidelity & Casualty Co, of New York v. Federal Express, 136 F.2d
35, 38-39 (6th Cir. 1943).
In this instance, the Bankruptcy Court's finding "that there
had not been an agreement as to the terms of the sale" of the
water park, In re BCD Corporation, supra, 119 F.3d at 862, was an
essential element in the Third District Court's ruling that the
terms of the 1994 order were different than the terms that
Golfland was trying to enforce.

Golfland is barred by collateral

estoppel from relitigating that issue.
2.

The Third District Court Was Fully Entitled to
Decide the Issues Before It and Did Not Usurp the
Role of the Jury.

Golfland argues that the Third District Court usurped
the role of the jury as the fact-finder and committed procedural
error because it failed to give Golfland the benefit of a jury
trial.

Golfland Brief at pp. 22-23.

Golfland's argument lacks

credence, however, because no complaint was on file and no jury
was in place.

The Liquidator's Motion sought the "permission of

the court" to sell the SAIC Barn.

The Third District Court had

full authority to rule on the Liquidator's Motion.
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No jury trial

is available to an objecting party under the Utah Insurance
Code.8
Despite the fact that the Golfland Motion was on file, the
Third District Court was not required to defer its decision on
whether the SAIC Barn could be sold until a complaint was filed
by Golfland and that Golfland's lawsuit fully resolved.

The

Liquidator clearly has the power under the Utah Insurance Code to
sell SAICs property, including the SAIC Barn, free and clear of
all liens, interests and encumbrances and to request, by motion,
approval from the Third District Court for any proposed sale.9
By seeking leave to sue the Liquidator, Golfland did not
automatically obtain a stay of all further proceedings in the
Third District Court regarding the SAIC Barn.
D.

The Third District Court Correctly Ruled That the 1994
Order Was No Longer Effective And That the SAIC Barn
Should Be Reauctioned.

8

If a jury trial had to be held each time the Liquidator
sought to sell an asset, the liquidation of an insurance company
would required years of litigation, and virtually all of the
assets of the insurance company would be expended in litigation
costs, leaving nothing for policyholders and creditors. The Utah
Insurance Code properly requires only that the Liquidator obtain
the "permission of the court" and.not that jury trials be
conducted every time the Liquidator seeks Third District Court
approval to sell an asset.
9

The powers of the Liquidator outlined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-27-314 include the following power: "He may exercise all
the powers conferred upon receivers by the laws of this state
which are not inconsistent with this chapter." Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-27-314 (23) . Utah law has long provided that receivers are
entitled to sell receivership property free and clear of liens in
order to facilitate the sale of the receivership property.
Chapman v. Schiller. 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1938).
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1.

The Third District Court Correctly Found That The
Conditions Precedent To Closing The Sale of the
SAIC Barn to Golfland Had Failed,

The Third District Court correctly applied the collateral
estoppel principles outlined above and found, based upon the
Bankruptcy Court's ruling, that at least three conditions
precedent to the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland as approved by
Judge Stirba in the 1994 Order were not met.

The Third District

Court's legal conclusion that the Liquidator was no longer
obligated to sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland naturally flowed from
those findings.
It is well settled that if a condition precedent does not
occur according to the express or implied terms of a contract,
and the condition precedent is not excused, the conditional duty
to close is discharged.
(1).

See Restatement, Contracts (2d) § 251

For instance, in Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. v.

Oldham. 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that
"[w]here fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon the act
or consent of a third person over whom neither party has any
control, the contract cannot be enforced unless the act is
performed or the consent given."
2.

Id. at 76.

The Third District Court Correctly Found That the
Terms of the Original Barn Sale Order Were Not the
Terms Golfland Was Seeking to Enforce.

The Third District Court also found in the 1995 Order that:
Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 Order authorizing the
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective
because the terms of the sale that Judge Stirba
31

approved in her Order were not the terms of the sale
that was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court Order•
R. 3133.

This finding mirrors the finding of the Bankruptcy

Court that "[t]he terms that the parties thought they were
bargaining and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the
sale which is ultimately proposed to the court.1' R. at 2606.
See also. In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 861. The
Bankruptcy Court found that the parties did not agree on the
terms of the sale, and there was no meeting of the minds for an
enforceable contract.10
Golfland is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel
from relitigating these findings of the Bankruptcy Court, which
the Third District Court relied upon to conclude that the sale
terms which Golfland was attempting to enforce were not the sale
terms which Judge Stirba had approved.

Moreover, Golfland is

precluded on two grounds from arguing that Judge Henriod should
have enforced the original terms approved by Judge Stirba.
First, the original sale terms approved by Judge Stirba required
a simultaneous sale of all three combined properties by a certain

10

The Tenth Circuit reconciled an apparent inconsistency in
the Bankruptcy Court's findings as follows: "We recognize an
apparent inconsistency in the bankruptcy court's oral findings
regarding whether all of the bidders understood that the
environmental warranties had been waived or whether the parties
could not agree on the terms of the sale. Nevertheless, it is
clear that, to reach its stated holding of vacating the confirmed
sale, the bankruptcy court must have relied on the finding that
the parties could not agree on the terms of the sale." In re BCD
Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 861 n.7.
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deadline.

A simultaneous sale could not longer be accomplished

once the Bankruptcy Court withdrew approval of the sale of the
Water Park to Golfland and eventually approved its sale to a
third party.

Second, Golfland also advanced the same argument to

the Tenth Circuit, who rejected it on the basis that "the
bankruptcy court could not enforce the original terms of the sale
because there had been no agreement as to the original terms . .
. ."

In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 862.
3.

Golfland is Precluded From Arguing That the
Failure of the Conditions Precedent Was Caused Bv
the Liguidator.

Golfland insists that the Liquidator allegedly caused the
conditions precedent to fail.

However, if anything, the evidence

before the Third District Court demonstrated that the conditions
precedent were not met because of Golfland's actions, not those
of the Liquidator.

R. 2062-2064, 2640.

Golfland claims that the

Liquidator should have sought additional approval from the
Bankruptcy Court because, according to Golfland, the parties
entered into a new agreement to supplement the provisions of the
previous contract for the sale of the Water Park.

Golfland Brief

at pp. 7-8, f 12.
It is inconsistent for Golfland to assert that the
Liquidator should have obtained approval for a "new" agreement
when Golfland repeatedly (but unsuccessfully) argued to the
Bankruptcy Court, to the Federal District Court, and to the Tenth
Circuit that there was no change in the terms of the sale.
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See,

In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 862.

Furthermore, Golfland's

argument assumes that the Bankruptcy Court would have approved
the alleged "new" terms for the sale.

However, the Bankruptcy

Court found that there was never any agreement on the material
sale terms to create an enforceable contract for the Bankruptcy
Court to enforce or approve.11
4.

The Third District Court Did Not Approve Any
Alleged Waiver of the Conditions Precedent
Mandated by Judge Stirba's Original Barn Sale
Order.

Golfland insists that the Liquidator "waived" the conditions
precedent to the sale of the SAIC Barn, and complains that the
Third District Court did not enforce the alleged "waiver."12

11

Golfland also complains that the Liquidator engaged in
"secret negotiations" and "double-dealing" with Peak, the back-up
bidder for the Water Park. Golfland Brief at p. 8. Golfland
evidently believes that the approved back-up bidder for the Water
Park should have been kept in the dark about the dispute between
Golfland and the sellers of the combined properties over the
terms of the sale. Golfland undoubtedly concludes that if Peak
had been kept in the dark, the sale to Golfland would never have
been upset. Golfland's obsession with secrecy highlights
Golfland's sole responsibility for causing the sale of the Water
Park and the simultaneous sale of the SAIC Barn to unravel.
12

The Liquidator previously acknowledged in the first appeal
to this Court that on April 8, 1994, the Liquidator offered to
proceed with the sale of the SAIC Barn separately on that date.
(Had such an offer been accepted by Golfland, immediate approval
for such an offer from the Third District Court would have been
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (9)). However, Golfland
refused the Liquidator's offer, choosing instead to "wait and
see" how the Bankruptcy Court ruled. The Liquidator's offer to
close solely on the SAIC Barn expired the same day it was made,
April 9, 1994, which was the deadline for the simultaneous sale
of the combined properties. Obviously Golfland is not attempting
retroactively to enforce this offer, which Golfland never
(continued...)
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However, this argument ignores the fact that no evidence of any
enforceable waiver was presented by Golfland to the Third
District Court,13 and also ignores the well-settled principle
that it is not the Liquidator, but the Third District Court which
must approve the terms of sale of property under the court's
receivership supervision, including any waiver of court-approved
conditions.
When the Third District Court entered the 1994 Order and
when it ordered that the SAIC Barn be reauctioned in the 1995
Order, it was functioning as a supervising receivership court.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (17) (Liquidator has all powers
conferred upon receivers by Utah state law) and Utah Code Ann. §
31A-27-314 (9) ("no transaction involving [SAIC] property with a
market value exceeding $25,000 may be concluded without the
express permission of the [Third District] court.")
A receivership is an equitable matter and is
entirely within the control of the court. . . . The
possession by the court of the res in a receivership
proceeding gives the court the power to determine all
questions concerning the ownership and disposition of
the property. The receiver is an officer and arm of
the court and acts under the direction and supervision
of the court. As such, he has only very limited powers
and should apply to the court for advice and
directions.

12

(. . .continued)
accepted, but rather is alleging a different "open-ended" waiver
allegedly made after this date.
13

While Golfland cites to memoranda in its Brief, these
citations are almost exclusively to legal argument and not to any
documents or other evidence before the Third District Court.
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Interlake Co, v. Von Hake. 697 P.2d 238, 239-40 (Utah 1985).
In Chapman v. Schiller. 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (Utah
1938), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
A receiver's sale is said to be a judicial sale as
contradistinguished from a sheriff's sale on execution
or foreclosure. And such judicial sales, unless
defined or regulated by statute, rest upon and are
governed bv the order of the court decreeing the sale.
In a judicial sale the court makes its own law of the
sale, subject only to the use of the sound discretion
in the exercise of the power.
(Emphasis added and citation omitted).
It is beyond dispute that the Third District Court had the
power and exercised that power to approve the conditions to the
sale of the SAIC Barn presented to it initially by the
Liquidator.

Those conditions were "set in stone" in the 1994

Order, and could not be altered without court approval.
When it became clear to the Third District Court that the
original conditions for the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland had
not been met, the Third District Court as the supervising
receivership court established new conditions for the sale (a new
auction), thereby modifying its original "law of the sale."

The

Third District Court's discretion in dealing with property in its
control of is not limited as Golfland contends.

Furthermore,

Golfland had no vested rights in the SAIC Barn when the
conditions for the sale to Golfland failed.

The Third District

Court was not required to adhere to Golfland's demands for the
property any more than the Third District Court was required to
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honor the Liquidator's request for authorization to sell the SAIC
Barn to Provo City.

The Third District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it ordered a new auction of the SAIC Barn, giving
all interested parties, including Golfland and Provo City, the
opportunity to participate.

Likewise, the Liquidator acted

appropriately by going to the Third District Court in his
capacity as receiver and seeking the direction of the supervising
receivership court on disposition of the SAIC Barn when the
original sale to Golfland failed.
Golfland's complaints suffer from the same defects
identified by Judge Kimball in the third BCD appeal.
Exhibit MB.M

See,

Golfland would like to have its original contract

for the SAIC Barn enforced.

Unfortunately for Golfland, the

conditions precedent for the sale never materialized, and there
was never any meeting of the minds to create an enforceable
contract in any event.

Golfland would also like to have its new

"contract" for the SAIC Barn enforced, which Golfland claims was
created when the Liquidator allegedly agreed to waive the
conditions precedent.
Golfland's standing to seek enforcement of any "new
contract" for the sale for the SAIC Barn is also seriously in
question.

When the 1994 Order became ineffective after the

conditions to the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland were not met,
Golfland was relegated to the status of a mere disappointed
bidder for the SAIC Barn, with no recognizable claim to enforce.
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In In re Broadmoor Place Investments, L.P. (G-K Development
Company. Inc. v. Broadmoor Place Investments, L.P.), 994 F.2d 744
(10th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994), an
unsuccessful bidder for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy debtor's property
which was sold to another bidder with the bankruptcy court's
approval argued that it was the rightful purchaser of the
property.

G-K, the unsuccessful bidder, argued on appeal that it

had a contract with the debtor for the purchase of the property.
The Tenth Circuit rejected this assertion.
While G-K calls its collective signed instruments
here a "contract", this is a misnomer since there can
be no contract in this situation without Bankruptcy
Court approval, In re Landscape Properties,
Inc., 100
B.R. 445, 447 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1988). Accordingly,
these instruments are but binding bids, and we so refer
to them hereafter.
Id. at 745 n.l.

The Tenth Circuit determined that G-K as an

unsuccessful bidder was not an "aggrieved person" with standing
to appeal the bankruptcy court's approval of the sale to another
party.

Absent court approval, a mere bidder for receivership

property has no recognizable interest in the disposition of the
receivership property.
5.

The Third District Court Properly Found That
Golfland's Tender Was Insufficient As a Matter of
Law.

Golfland argues that the Third District Court erred in
ruling that Golfland failed to make a proper tender of the
purchase funds for the SAIC Barn.

Golfland Brief at p. 46.

obtain a decree of specific performance . . ., the aggrieved
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"To

party must make an unconditional tender of the performance
required by the agreement."

Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp.,

846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992).

To make an unconditional

tender, the party tendering must tender exactly what it agreed to
perform when the contract was made, and may not impose new
conditions.

"A tender that contains an improper condition or

requirement disqualifies a party from obtaining a decree of
specific performance."

Id.

Under the terms of the Golfland Offer for the SAIC Barn,
Golfland was to "deposit with the Title Company the entire
balance of the Purchase Price in cash or other immediately
available funds."

R. 1250.

Golfland deposited the funds with

the Title Company, but with the express instruction that the
funds on deposit were there at the sole discretion of Golfland.
R. 1934.

Because the Golfland deposit was conditional, the Third

District Court was fully justified in finding that Golfland
failed to make an unconditional tender of the purchase price and
thus lost its right to seek specific performance, even assuming
that a contract for the sale of the SAIC Barn was formed.
II.

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY PROCEDURAL
ERRORS BY ORDERING A REAUCTION OF THE SAIC BARN.
Golfland contends in Point II of its Brief that the Third

District Court committed "glaring" procedural errors and that as
a result of those errors, Golfland has been deprived of its
constitutional right to due process and to a jury.
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Golfland

Brief at pp. 22-26.

Golfland's due process argument ignores the

collateral estoppel effects of the four day evidentiary hearing
before the Bankruptcy Court.

The issues before the Third

District Court were fully and fairly litigated, with both SAIC
and Golfland presenting documentary evidence, lengthy memoranda,
and oral arguments.

Moreover, none of the purported procedural

errors were ever raised by Golfland before the Third District
Court, and therefore Golfland cannot now raise them for the first
time on appeal.
A.

The Third District Court Did Not Err in Finding That
Evidence Was Submitted With the Pleadings.

Golfland argues that no evidence was submitted to the Third
District Court.

Golfland Brief at p. 24.

This is incorrect.

Both SAIC and Golfland submitted substantial documentary evidence
with their pleadings (See R. 1835-1862; 1922-1956; 2055-2075;
2600-2644) in accordance with Rule 4-501(1)(a) & (b) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.

Those sections set forth the

"procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents
with the court."

They provide in relevant part as follows:

(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions,
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion. . . .
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
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(Emphasis added).
The Liquidator and Golfland utilized the foregoing procedure
to present to the Third District Court lengthy memoranda and
supporting documentation and deposition excerpts which both the
Liquidator and Golfland contended supported their respective
positions.

Golfland did not object, nor did Golfland claim that

any of the documents attached to the Liquidator's memoranda were
not relevant or admissible or that they lacked foundation.
Golfland itself used this procedure for bringing before the Third
District Court the evidence and documents that it asserted were
relevant to its position.

It is ironic that Golfland is now

arguing that the documents and other evidence submitted to the
Third District Court should not be considered when Golfland
itself followed this procedure in support of its position.14
1.

Golfland Waived By Acquiescence Any Objection to
the Submission of the Documentary Evidence.

Golfland waived by acquiescence any objection to the
submission of evidence in the form of documents attached to the
parties' memoranda.

Golfland could have objected to the

evidence, moved to strike, submitted affidavits of its own, or
requested an evidentiary hearing.

Compare, Mel Trimble Real

Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., supra, 758 P.2d at 455.
Golfland did none of these things.

14

Instead, Golfland limited its

It is also ironic that Golfland cites to the allegedly
"inadmissible" or "incompetent" documentary evidence in its
appeal brief. See, Golfland Brief at pp. 5-10.
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response to arguing the meaning of the facts in the Liquidator's
documents and to legal arguments, and then Golfland attached its
own documents to its memoranda and argued the meaning of the
facts in those documents.

Golfland cannot complain about this

procedure for the first time on appeal when it acquiesced in this
process before the Third District Court and even submitted its
own evidence in this form.

As this Court stated in the Mel

Trimble case under similar circumstances, •• [s]ince the parties
all but conceded that the opinion alone would permit the district
court to make an informed decision on the applicability of
collateral estoppel, the trial court did not err in failing to
review the record of the prior proceeding on its own motion."
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. supra. 758
P.2d at 456.
As in Mel Trimble, the Liquidator raised collateral estoppel
agreements.

Also, as in Mel Trimble, Golfland limited its

response to arguing what the documents meant and to legal
arguments.

Thus, evidentiary objections were waived, and

Golfland may not now argue that the Third District Court erred in
finding that evidence was submitted with the pleadings.
Golfland also argues that even though documents and
deposition excerpts were submitted to the Third District Court,
they were not admissible.

However, under Rule 103 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, Golfland was obligated to raise any objections
that it may have had to the admissibility of the documents that
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were submitted to the Third District Court by the Liquidator.15
Golfland never argued that the documents submitted to the Third
District Court by the Liquidator were inadmissible because they
contained hearsay, were not authenticated, lacked foundation, or
had some other defect.

Having failed to raise those issues prior

to the hearing, Golfland waived any objections it may have had to
the evidence submitted to the Third District Court by the
Liquidator.16

D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah

1989) (party's failure to object to evidentiary problems or
errors waives the objection).
Golfland maintains that it objected to the portion of the
Proposed Order that stated that evidence was submitted with the
pleadings.

Golfland Brief at p. 23, n.20.

However, this

objection went only to the form of the Third District Court's
order.

This was after the hearing had already been conducted and

the Third District Court had already ruled.
raise evidentiary objections.

This was too late to

"Error may not be predicated upon

a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial

15

Obviously, Golfland is estopped from objecting to the
admissibility of the documents which Golfland itself submitted to
the Third District Court.
16

Even on appeal, Golfland does not challenge the accuracy or
the evidentiary value of any of the documents submitted to the
Liquidation Court by the Liquidator. Golfland merely argues that
the documents were not "supported by any affidavit or otherwise
submitted in admissible form." Golfland Brief at p. 25. Thus,
Golfland has failed to show that a "substantial right" was
affected, as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a).
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right of a party is affected, and . . . a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record."
(emphasis added).

Utah R. Evid. 103(a)

By the time the Proposed Order was submitted,

the hearing was over.

The Third District Court could not rule on

evidentiary objections nor could the Liquidator take steps to
overcome any objection.

For example, if Golfland had concerns

about lack of foundation for a document, the Liquidator could
have offered affidavits or other testimony.

It is now too late

to do so and it is also too late for Golfland to object.

Its

objections, if any, are not "timely" under Rule 103(a).
B.

The Third District Court Did Not Err By Not Holding An
Evidentiary Hearing.

The Liquidator and Golfland had the opportunity to explain
their respective positions at the Third District Court hearing.
During the hearing, the Third District Court also considered the
arguments of counsel relating to the Bankruptcy Court's four day
evidentiary hearing, where Golfland had the benefit of an
exhaustive consideration of all aspects of the failed sale of the
combined properties.

The Third District Court chose to rule

based upon the evidence presented to it (on judicial notice and
collateral estoppel grounds) rather than ordering an evidentiary
hearing.

That decision by the Third District Court was not in

error.
Golfland had full notice of the issues being raised.
matters before the Third District Court were fully and
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The

extensively briefed by both the Liquidator and Golfland with
supporting documentation and deposition excerpts.

Golfland was

given every opportunity to address the Liquidator's position, to
object to the evidence submitted by the Liquidator, and to
convince the Third District Court of Golfland's position at the
hearing.

This amounts to full and fair litigation.
1.

Golfland Waived Its Right to An Evidentiary
Hearing.

Moreover, Golfland also waived the right to an evidentiary
hearing.

None of Golfland's memoranda requested an evidentiary

hearing on the Liquidator's Motion for Supplemental Order, or
even suggested that an evidentiary hearing would be appropriate
or necessary for the District Court to rule on the Liquidator's
motion.

In the case of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v.

Baglev & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals
held the following:

fl

[T]he fact that none of the parties

requested an evidentiary hearing prior to October 25, 1988, the
date of oral argument, suggests that, as of that date, they saw
no need for such a hearing and thus waived it."

Id. at 7.

See

also Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) ("Issues not raised in the trial court in timely
fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering
their merits on appeal.")
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Golfland never suggested that the rules governing summary
judgment motions should apply to the Liquidator's Motion.
Golfland only requested oral argument on the Liquidator's Motion,
which the Third District Court granted.

By failing to request an

evidentiary hearing prior to oral argument, Golfland waived any
right to an evidentiary hearing on the Liquidator's Motion, and
may not belatedly raise that issue for the first time on appeal.
III. THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS NOT INTERNALLY
INCONSISTENT OR OTHERWISE FATALLY FLAWED.
Notwithstanding Golfland's complaints, the Barn Order is not
internally inconsistent or otherwise fatally flawed.

The Barn

Order does not deprive Golfland of any rights because it orders
the Liquidator to sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction to the
party making the highest and best offer, thereby providing
Golfland an opportunity to participate.
The fact that the Third District Court granted the Golfland
Motion at the same time it granted the Liquidator's Motion does
not render the 1995 Order internally inconsistent.
Motion was a procedural motion.

The Golfland

Under the Utah Insurance Code

all actions against SAIC and the Liquidator are stayed.

Utah

Code Ann. § 31A-27-317 (1). In granting the Golfland Motion, the
Third District Court merely lifted the stay and gave Golfland the
opportunity to file a complaint setting forth whatever causes of
action it deemed appropriate against SAIC.

The fact that the

Third District Court granted the Golfland Motion did not
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constitute a ruling on the sufficiency of the Golfland Complaint,
nor the claims set forth therein.

Nor does it preclude the

Liquidator from arguing that Golfland's claims are barred by
collateral estoppel.17
A.

The District Court's Finding That the SAIC Barn Was Not
Unique Was Not Central to the Finding That the
Conditions Precedent to Sale the SAIC Barn to Golfland
Were Not Met.

After ruling that the Liquidator had no contractual duty to
sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland, the Third District Court went on
to find that the SAIC Barn was not so unique that specific
performance would be warranted.

Golfland complains that the

record does not support this finding and that the Third District
Court therefore erred.

Golfland Brief at pp. 27-28. However,

the finding of uniqueness was not central to the Third District
Court's finding that the conditions precedent for a sale of the
SAIC Barn to Golfland had not been satisfied.

This Court can

still affirm the 1995 order without relying upon this finding.
Whether or not the SAIC Barn is unique, the Liquidator had no
obligation to sell it to Golfland.
B.

Golfland's "Shocks The Conscience" Standard is Not
Applicable in This Case.

17

Neither party appealed the Third District Court's order
granting the Golfland Motion. The validity of the Golfland
Complaint is not before this Court but remains before the Third
District Court.
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Golfland has devoted much time and energy to decisions from
various federal courts regarding the finality of judiciallyapproved sales, while virtually ignoring the Tenth Circuit's
pronouncements on this issue in the companion Water Park case
lost by Golfland,
859-860.

See, In re BCD Corporation, supra, 119 F.3d at

Golfland asserts that the Third District Court

exhibited a "complete misunderstanding" of the legal standard
governing judicial sales.

Golfland Brief at p. 30.

The cases cited by Golfland are not relevant.

The Third

District Court did not set aside the 1994 Order, which merely
authorized (but did not order) the Liquidator to sell the SAIC
Barn to Golfland if all of the conditions outlined in the
approval documents submitted to the Third District Court were
met.

Those conditions were not met, and the anticipated sale

failed.

Once the sale failed, the 1994 Order became

"ineffective" as found by Judge Henriod; not because the 1994
Order was "set aside," but because the conditions for the 1994
Order to take effect were never met.
Even if the Third District Court is deemed to have vacated a
judicial sale of the SAIC Barn, the standard adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court is "that a court of equity may overturn a judicial
sale for good and sufficient cause."

Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d

52, 337 P.2d 429, 430 (1959).
The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial
sales except when they are manifestly unfair. . . .
This is because courts hope that such a policy will
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encourage bidding at judicial sales and because it
appears to be a waste of time to require a new sale
where little evidence is presented to show that the bid
price at the new sale will be any different from the
bid at the old.
Id.

at 431 (citations omitted).

Such good and sufficient cause

was clearly established by the evidence presented to the Third
District Court, and it would be manifestly unfair to mandate that
the SAIC Barn be sold to Golfland when the carefully negotiated
conditions precedent to the sale approved by the Third District
Court were never met.

The Barn Order is neither internally

inconsistent, nor erroneous in any other way.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding Golfland's arguments that it has been
deprived of due process, ordering the Third District Court to
conduct a meaningless additional evidentiary hearing on
Golfland's meritless claims would be an enormous waste of
judicial resources.

Notwithstanding three federal appeals,

Golfland has been unsuccessful in reversing the Bankruptcy
Court's withdrawal of approval of the sale of the Water Park to
Golfland, which "frustrated" the sale of the SAIC Barn to
Golfland as found by the Third District Court.

The Third

District Court acted properly and within its powers as the
supervising receivership court in ordering a new auction of the
SAIC Barn.

The Liquidator respectfully requests that the Sale

Order be affirmed.
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case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's order

setting aside its approval of a sale of property to appellant
Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. and accepting a new bid from
appellee Peak Investment, Inc. on the same property.

The court has

considered the arguments presented by all parties, and rules as
follows:

The court finds that the bankruptcy court's ruling that the
sale

should be set at-ide is not an abuse of discretion.

bankruptcy

court

founi that

there was a mistake

in the

The
sale

sufficient to justify setting aside the sale because "[©Jveryone at
the auction believed that the risk of environmental problems on the
property being purchassd was shifted to the buyer."

This factual

rinding is supported by sufficient evidence in the record, and the^
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court's finding that tiis misunderstanding is a mistake as tc a
material term of the s ile appears correct.

Such a mistake would

indicate that the bidders did not have a fair opportunity to bid at
the sale, and mistakes which affect the fairness of the bidding
process are the type which would ordinarily be. seen as sufficient
to justify setting asice a confirmed sale.

See Mason v. AshharV.

383 F.2d 547, 552 (10th Clr. 1967).

In addition, the court finds that appellee Peak Investments,
Inc. had sufficient interest as an approved backup bidder to give
it standing to challenges the confirmation of the sale, and that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider the objection, which
was relevant to the «alf! of the property over which the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction due to the fact that the mistake in the
bidding process affected the sale of all three properties, and not
just the one property which was found to actually have environmental cleanup problems.

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the bankruptcy court
is hereby AFFIWffiD.

DATED this _*LZJf day of
BY THE COURT:
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RAY QUINNEY
IN RE BCD CORPORATION,

JUN 0 8 1998
OPINION AND ORDER

Debtor,

GOLFLAND ENTERTAINMENT
CENTERS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.

& NEBEKER

District Court No. 2:97 CV 953K

BCD CORPORATION and SOUTHERN
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellees.

This matter is before the court on an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division. This matter came on for oral argument on June 2,1998.
The appellant was represented by Zachary T. Shields, Southern American Insurance Company
was represented by Craig Carlile and Duane H. Gillman represented himself as the trustee. Oral
argument was heard and the court took the matter under advisement. The court has carefully
considered all briefs and other materials submitted by the parties. The court has further
considered the law and facts relevant to this appeal. Now being fully advised, the court enters the
following Opinion and Order.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal arises out of three consolidated orders entered by the Bankruptcy Court for
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the District of Utah, Central Division. The first Order is dated October 2,1997 and is an Order
Sustaining Trustee's Claims Objection and Disallowing the Proof of Claim filed by Golfland
against the Debtor. The second Order is dated November 5,1997 and authorizes the Trustee's
entry into settlement stipulation and mutual release of claims. This Order specifically gave court
approval for the payment of estate funds to Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC").
The final Order is also dated November 5,1997 and authorizes interim distribution to creditors.
The appellant, Golfland, seeks reversal of these orders on the basis that actions of the Debtor in
1994 resulted in damage to Golfland and Golfland should be given an opportunity to litigate the
issues giving rise to these damages.
In 1994 the Debtor, BCD, filed Bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. At the time of the filing, BCD attempted to sell its major asset, Seven Peaks Water Park in
Provo, Utah. An auction was held and Golfland entered the highest bid of $2,200,000,00. BCD
and Golfland entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of the water park at that price in
February of 1994 (the "February Contract"). The terms of the February Contract were set forth in
a written document, except as modified orally by the parties. The terms of the February Contract
were presented to the Bankruptcy Court at a hearing on February 23,1994 and the Court
approved the sale of the water park pursuant to the contract. At the time of the auction, a second
company, Peak Investment, entered a backup bid for the water park for approximately
$400,000.00 less than the bid of Golfland.
After the approval of the February Contract some disputes arose between the Debtor and
Golfland. After negotiations, a second contract was entered into between the parties in April of
1994 (the "April Contract"). The parties did not seek, nor did they obtain, court approval of this
2

contract. On April 7,1994, Peak Investment filed a Motion with the Bankruptcy Court
challenging the Court's approval of the February Contract. Both Golfland and the Debtor
opposed Peak's Motion, however, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Motion vacating its
approval of the February Contract. Although the Debtor opposed the Motion, once the
Bankruptcy Court vacated the February Contract, the Debtor held a second auction for the water
park in an attempt to make more money. The water park was sold to a third party for
$3,600,000.00.
Subsequent to the sale of the water park to a third party, Golfland appealed the
Bankruptcy Court's Order vacating the February Contract. In September of 1995, Judge David
Sam of the United States District Court for the District of Utah affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's
Order. This decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment,
Inc., 119 F.3d 852 (1997). Golfland also filed a Proof of Claim in the Debtor's Bankruptcy Case
which was objected to by the Trustee. A hearing was held on the matter and the Bankruptcy
Court initially disallowed the Proof of Claim on the basis of collateral estoppel. Golfland filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion for
Reconsideration and again disallowed the Proof of Claim, this time citing the Tenth Circuit
opinion and the "law of the case" doctrine. Shortly thereafter the Bankruptcy Court entered the
Stipulation Order and the Disbursement Order.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the review of ordersfromthe Bankruptcy Court, there are three standards of review
that may be applied. First, where the Bankruptcy Court is thefinderof fact, the court's factual
determinations will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Bankruptcy Rule
3

8013 and Taylor v. I.R.S., 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995). Afindingof fact is clearly erroneous
only if the court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See In re
Mama D'Angelo, Inc., 55 F.3d 552 (10th Cir. 1995). Secondly, a bankruptcy court's ruling
involving findings of fact may be overturned if the findings are premised on improper legal
standards or on proper legal standards improperly applied. In these instances, the review of this
court shall be de novo. See In re Hedged-Investment Associates, Inc., 84 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir.
1996). Lastly, this court will exercise de novo review over the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions of
law. See Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1989). Further, mixed questions of law and fact
which involve primarily a consideration of legal principles are reviewed de novo. See In re RutiSweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988). Approvement of a compromise settlement and
of interim distributions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d
890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1989) and In re Smith, 180 B.R. 648, 651 (D. Utah 1995).
III. DISCUSSION
Golfland's Proof of Claim consisted of seven causes of action. These included (1) breach
of the February Contract, (2) breach of the April Contract, (3) breach of implied covenant of
good faith, (4) negligence, (5) willful misconduct and bad faith, (6) remedies for detrimental
reliance and (7) unjust enrichment. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed the Proof
of Claim on the basis that the Tenth Circuit had already decided that no contract existed and
therefore Golfland did not have a cause of action. The Bankruptcy Court cited the "law of the
case" doctrine in support of this ruling. In discussing the "law of the case" doctrine in Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 81 F.3d 1540,1543 (10th Cir. 1996), the Court stated that:
The law of the case doctrine obligates every court to honor the
4

decisions of higher courts in the judicial hierarchy. "When a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Thus, for
example, a trial court may not reconsider a question decided by an
appellate court.
{citations omitted). Golfland argues on appeal that this was error for the reason that the Proof of
Claim was not brought in the same case as was considered by the Tenth Circuit.
In BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment, Inc., 119 F.3d 852 (1997) the Tenth Circuit held
that it was not error or an abuse of discretion on the part of the Bankruptcy Court to set aside the
sale of the water park to Golfland. The Tenth Circuit further held that there had not been an
agreement as to the terms of the sale and "the bankruptcy court could not enforce the original
terms of the sale because there had been no agreement as to the original terms

" Id. at 862.

In other words, the Tenth Circuit's ruling makes it clear that no contract existed between
Golfland and BCD Corporation. Even though Golfland's Proof of Claim was not brought in the
identical case that was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, it is clear to this court that all claims
brought in the Proof of Claim are untenable based upon the umbrella of the Tenth Circuit's
ruling and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of thefinalsale for $3,600,000.00 to a third party.
All of Golfland's claims against BCDflowfromthe failure to perform under the February
Contract. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that there was no meeting of the minds as to the February
Contract and therefore no contract existed. If there was no contract, Golfland does not have a
remedy at law. Although this may not be exactly the kind of case that the "law of the case"
doctrine typically applies to, this court can not reverse the Tenth Circuit's ruling that there was
no contract between the parties which is what would have to be done in order for the appellant to
have a cause of action.
5

This court agrees with the appellees that when the February Contract was vacated,
Golfland became nothing more than an unsuccessful and disappointed bidder. In In re
Broadmoor, 994 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that an unsuccessful bidder
does not have a breach of contract claim. In its ruling, the Bankruptcy Court stated that:
This Court ruled that there was no contract and that was affirmed
by the Tenth Circuit. I think the concept that is bothering Golfland
is that there is not a remedy for every occurrence of damages.
Before you can have damages you must have a cause of action.
X 1

anscript of September 4, 1997 Hearing at p. 20. Golfland may very well have been damaged by

the actions of the Debtor in this matter, however, it simply does not have a cause of action under
the law.
Lastly, Golfland argues that even if some of its allegations are barred by the Tenth Circuit
ruling, not all of the allegations should be barred, specifically the claim for unjust enrichment.
Golfland had the opportunity at two different hearings before the Bankruptcy Court to put forth
evidence to support its claim that some of its causes of action encompassed different issues than
the issue ruled upon by the Tenth Circuit. The fact that Golfland did not put on sufficient
evidence when it had the chance does not mean that it should have another opportunity before the
Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court heard the evidence and found that Golfland did not
meet its burden of proof. This is a factual finding that will not be disturbed by this court.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED.
DATED this V ' d a v of June, 1998
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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EXHIBIT C
ADDENDUM
—Bankruptcy Order dated July 6, 1994 entered by the Honorable Glen E. Clark
—Transcript of June 6, 1994 hearing before the Honorable Glen E. Clark on
Motion to Enforce Sale to Alternative Bidder and Motion for Stay and Motion for
Relief from Stay

JUL 0 7 1994
& NEBEKEfl
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423)
KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Peak Investments Ltd.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT-OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
In

re:

O R D E R

BCD Corporation,

Bankruptcy Number 92C-22663
(Chapter 11)

Debtor.
Peak Investment, Inc.'s Amended Motion to Enforce Sale to
Alternative Bidder and Motion for Stay, came before the Court for
hearing on June 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1994.

BCD Corporation

("Debtor") was represented by William Thomas Thurman and Mona
Lyman; Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. ("Golfland") was
represented by Jeffrey L. Shields and Steven L. Tyler; Robert E.
Wilcox, the Commissioner of Insurance of the state of Utah and
liquidator of Southern American "insurance Company was represented
by Brent D. Wride and Rick L. Rose; Peak Investments, Inc. was
represented by Michael R. Carlston, Kim R. Wilson and Ryan E.
Tibbitts.
The Court having heard the evidence and arguments of
counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties,
EXHIBIT "F"
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and other pertinent law, and being fully advised in the premises,
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record
which are incorporated herein and adopted by this reference.
Based upon those findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows:
1.

The sale to Golfland is not a sale which has been

approved by the Court, and that sale is, therefore, not
authorized,
2.

The major changes in the terms of the sale did not give

the bidders a fair opportunity to bid at the sale and the notice
and further proceedings did not give the Court an opportunity to
make a reasoned decision about whether or not to approve the sale
and other parties an opportunity to properly object.
3.

The Order Approving Sale of Property Free and Clear of

Liens, Interests and Encumbrances dated March 31, 1994, is hereby
set aside.
4-

The Debtor is ordered not to proceed with a final sale

of the water park property without further order of the Court.
DATED this

(p

day of July, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

-.' 7 -T
'...ED
61994 .

&

en E. Clark, United States
Bankruptcy Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
• ••

In re:

)
92C-2263

BCD CORPORATION,)
Debtor,)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLEN E. CLARK
Monday/ June 6, 1994
2:00 p.m.
Motion to Enforce Sale to Alternative
Bidder and Motion for Stay
Motion for Relief From Stay

ALPHA COURT REPORTING SERVICE
520 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
810-532-5645
PAM SMITH, CSR,RPR,CM
6-6-94ps.
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APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL:

2

For the Debtor:

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN.
BY: Mona Lyman
& William Thurman
10 East South Temple, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

For Peak Investments, Inc.:

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
BY: Michael Carlston
& Ryan Tibbetts
10 Exchange Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10

For the Utah State
Insurance Commissioner:
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
BY: Rick L. Rose
79 So. Main, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

13
14
15

For Golfland Entertainment:

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
BY: Jeffrey L. Shields
10 East South Temple, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, JUNE 6, 1994f 2:00 P.M.

2

PROCEEDINGS.

3

THE CLERK:

This is in the matter of BCD.

4

THE COURT:

Will counsel note your appearance.

5

MR. CARLSTON:

6

for Peak Investment.

7

MS. LYMAN:

8

MR. ROSE:

Rick Rose on behalf of Southern

American Insurance Company in liquidation.

11
12

Mona Lyman and Bill Thurman on behalf

of the debtor.

9
10

Michael Carlston and Ryan Tibbetts

MR. SHIELDS:

Jeffrey L. Shields on behalf of

Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc.

13

THE COURT:

As I understand it the Court has

14

allocated for closing arguments up to 4 0 minutes per side. We

15

will be timing that. Mr. Carlston, you may begin.

16

MR. SHIELDS:

Your Honor, I had just one

17

procedural matter.

18

admission of GE-11 through GE-23. I would so move at this

19

time.

20

I realized I had neglected to move for

MR. CARLSTON:

Your Honor, subject to my earlier

21

objection, which was primarily wasted on duplication, and on

22

the additional qualification relating to certain of those

23

exhibits,' that they contain information that was not really

24

offered for the truth of the matter presented, I would not

25

object to the admission of the exhibits.

00400

1

came to the court with. I didn't hear one thing from them

2

explaining how they could justify this allocation in a way

3

that deprives BCD of a hundred and thirteen thousand that

4

ought to be in it. I didn't hear anything at all about the

5

other conditions.

6

We submit, Your Honor, that it's appropriate to set

7

this aside and warrant Peak to have other bidding take place,

8

and the fact there's some complications from it isn't a

9

justification for not doing it when the integrity of the

10

process is called into being in such a primary way by the way

11

they've acted.

12

I submit it.

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16

Thank you* The court will attempt to

rule on the record sooner rather than later this afternoon.
(Whereupon, a brief recess was held.)
THE COURT:

The court has heard the evidence and

17

the arguments of counsel and reviewed the pertinent law, and

18

will now make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on

19

the record.

20

The chronology here is important. On December 22nd,

21

1993, the debtor filed a motion to approve a sale. It had

22

received and accepted, subject to court approval, an offer

23

from B&B Properties to purchase the water park of the debtor

24

and two adjacent properties for $1,950,000 subject to higher

25

and better offers presented in writing two days before a
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hearing on the motion.
On February 22nd, one day prior to a hearing,
having received written offers from Peak, Golfland, and
University Properties, the debtor and the other sellers
determined to conduct an auction and gave bidders
approximately two hours notice thereof.
All of the written offers track the B&B offer
except that of University which waived nearly all of the
conditions.
At the auction University agreed that that included
most of paragraph 5 of the B&B offer. Everyone at the offer
believed that the risk of environmental problems on the
property being purchased was thereby shifted to the buyer.
Golfland submitted the highest bid at the auction.
On February 23rd there was a hearing before this
court in both the BCD and the CDX cases. The sellers asked
the court to approve the Golfland bid, and the Peak bid as a
backup bid.
Thereafter, a dispute arose between the sellers and
Golfland about the terms of the sale. The sellers egreed to
make the following concessions to Golfland. Among others they
were that the sellers would bear up to $200,000 of the costs
of environmental remediation and one half of a $33,000 bond,
which had been filed to meet the requirements of the City of
Provo.
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On March 2 8th an order approving the sale to
Golfland was presented to the court by the debtor and signed
by the court on March 31st.
The mailing certificate prepared by the sellers and
attached to that order did not include Peak. At the time of
the hearing Peak was not advised of the concessions or the
disputes. The court knew nothing about the concessions or the
disputes until after the order was signed.
Mr. Monson, the attorney documenting the
transaction for the sellers, wanted to attach to the order a
document showing what the offer was, but because the parties
couldn't agree just referred to the offer made at the sale.
This factual situation prompted the court to
inquire of the parties whether an oral auction could ever be
conducted subject to higher and better offers. Upon the
court's —

upon consideration of this matter the court

believes that it can because the parties are obligated to
give notice to the court, including all of the terms of the
auction, and the parties who are affected thereby are able to
come to the court and argue as to what offer was actually a
better offer.
In this case the terms were not disclosed to the
court. The terms that the parties thought they were
bargaining on and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of
the sale which is ultimately proposed to the court. The court
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didn't have the opportunity to give that vital protection
because the court didn't have the information that it needed.
The parties didn't have the information they needed to make
appropriate objections and arguments. That part of the notice
and hearing requirement for the sale of property simply was
not met.
The buyer and the debtor argue about the importance
of the finality of the sale, and the court certainly agrees
that that is very important, and it is important.

Its

importance is illustrated here.
The sale in question before the court has not been
consummated. The terms of that sale were first brought to the
attention of this court in connection with this hearing. They
weren't brought to the attention of this court in connection
with any prior hearing. Although the debtor in the shoes of
the Trustee needs some flexibility, the major change in the
terms of this sale simply did not give the bidders a fair
opportunity to bid at the sale.

The notice did not give the

court an opportunity to make a reasoned decision about
whether or not to approve the sale.
The court notes that the order with respect to both
the sale to Golfland and the sale to Peak was permissive.
That permission having been given, any change of the terms
should have been noticed and brought to the attention of the
court to rule upon. That did not happen.
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It is argued that the parties are before the wrong
court being in this case before this case in BCD. The

|
i

hearing, however, was in both the BCD and the CDX cases. It

j

is clear that the property being sold out of the BCD estate
is the lead property of the three properties being sold. The
CDX order, like the BCD order, is permissive.
Although this court at this time is not able to
rule in the other two cases, it did rule in the BCD case with
respect to the water park property and can rule in the motion
before it with respect to that property.
The court finds that the sale proposed to Golfland
is not a sale which has been approved by the court, and that
the sale is, therefore, not authorized.
The debtor asks for some direction from the court.
The debtor in the first instance has the responsibility to
design an appropriate sale and ask the court to approve that
design or to proceed with it. But ultimately it has the
responsibility to ask the court to approve what it's done to
make its sale only subject to notice and approval by the
court. That's what the debtor needs to do in order to have an
effective sale in this case.
Therefore, the debtor is ordered not to proceed
without further order of the court with a final sale of the
water park property.
Mr. Caxlston, you may prepare an order consistent
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with these findings and conclusions.
MR. CARLSTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Court is in recess.

(Whereupon, court was held in recess at 4:25.)
***
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, PAMELA C. SMITH, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public within and
for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby
certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me
at the time and place set forth herein and were taken down by
me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting
under my direction and supervision:
That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct
transcription of my shorthand notes so taken. .
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and
affixed my seal this

1/

, 1994.

day of CK>J^±J^A^
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$

PAMELA C. SMITH,
Notary P u b l i c
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